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Abstract
The article examines the historical processes and the motivations of contemporary Hungarian
politicians to officially rehabilitate the memory of Cécile Tormay, the internationally acclaimed
writer and founder of Hungary’s conservative women’s movement. Through tracing the politics
of remembering Tormay since World War II it demonstrates how Tormay’s recent reemergence
as a new national icon was intimately tied to a decisive shift in the direction of Hungarian politics
from a pro-Western stance to one that is openly hostile towards Western liberalism. Tormay, part
of the ruling elite in the authoritarian interwar Horthy regime, was a fierce anticommunist,
antisemite, and staunch nationalist who rallied Hungarians to reclaim territories lost after World
War I. Already a national icon, Tormay became a central protagonist of one of the largest interwar
political scandals in which she was accused of homosexuality and sleeping with the wives of high
aristocrats. Yet, stunningly, neither during the interwar years nor since 1989 has the scandal
around her alleged homosexuality stopped centre-right and increasingly right wing (Fidesz) and
far right (Jobbik) politicians from embracing her as Hungary’s ideal patriotic female figure of the
past century. Such a paradox the article contends can be explained by these regimes’ different
approaches to public and private sexuality. By making Tormay’s private sexuality irrelevant both
the interwar and post-socialist conservative governments could hold up Tormay’s public vision of
anticommunism, antisemitism, nationalism, and traditional gender norms as their own.
Introduction
The study of collective memory and changing national memory cultures in post-socialist
East-Central Europe is a thriving field. The vigour with which national governments across the
former Eastern block have engaged in reevaluating and recreating their respective histories since
1989 have provided a fertile interdisciplinary research area. In general, scholars have identified
trends that point to the restructuring of public memory along the lines of condemning the
communist past while reviving and recreating national traditions.1 Having to invent useable
pasts East-Central European governments along with civil and private organizations created and
at times recreated national anniversaries, museums and monuments. One of the most visible
aspects of “correcting state-socialist interpretations” of history has been the replacement of
public figures commemorated under socialism with new national patriotic historical luminaries,
whom Communists parties had deemed unsuitable. This article turns to an individual, whose
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recent lustration by an increasingly right wing Fidesz led Hungarian government and the far right
party Jobbik, is a perfect example of such a pattern, at least on the surface. Certainly, as a writer
and the president of Hungary’s interwar conservative women’s movement, Cécile Tormay serves
as an ideal representative of the formerly condemned Christian conservative interwar era. In the
eyes of many, Tormay’s ardent nationalism, antisemitisim and conservative gender views would
inevitably make her the embodiment of Hungarian national honour and greatness. Yet, once we
consider Tormay’s personal life, which fell conspicuously far from both her contemporary
conservative as well as current right and far right visions, Tormay’s unreserved rehabilitation
becomes all the more surprising. For the purpose of this article conservative(s) refers to the
governing parties of interwar Hungary between 1922 and 1938 (Egységes Párt (Unity Party)
1922- 1931 and Nemzeti Egység (National Unity Party) 1932- 1930. In the post 89 context
conservative denotes those generally on right who identify with the legacy of interwar
conservativsm, and prioritize furthering the interest of national (middle class) in terms of
politics, culture and economics over political, cultural and economic liberalism. The term centreright is used to define Fidesz prior to 2008. Finally, the term far right is used to denote
Hungarian parties following 1989 that believe in the fundamental restructuring of political and
economic organization of the Hungarian state along radical anti-Communist, anitsemitic, and
nationalist lines.2 So, why would conservative regimes in the interwar past and post 1989 parties
on the right embrace a female figure whose personal life was smeared by one of Hungary’s
largest (homo)sexual scandals? How could conservatives and the far right commemorate a
single woman who never married, did not have children, and was allegedly a lesbian as “one of
the greatest Hungarians”? And finally, what does looking at drama that unfolded over Tormay’s
reinstatement reveal about the relationship between interwar Hungarian history and
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contemporary politics? It is these questions that the article aims to address by analysing historical
records, including court documents and newspaper articles from the interwar era, along with the
examination of media representations of Tormay since 1989.

Cécile Tormay: A Conservative Sappho?
Perhaps there is no other prominent author in twentieth-century Hungarian
literature who has been so unfairly plagued with forgetfulness as Cécile Tormay,
all as the result of a very "successful" cultural policy. Indeed, she should be placed
among the greatest of our writers since until fairly recently she was the closest to
being worthy of the Nobel Prize for Literature, which was not attained only due to
her early death.3
Indeed, in the eyes of many Hungarian people in the 1920s and 1930s, Cécile Tormay
represented the “Great Saving Soul” of “Mutilated Hungary.”4 For most Hungarians as well as
foreigners she was known as the writer of “Bujdosó könyv,” or An Outlaw’s Diary, an
internationally recognised book about the evils of communism.5 The work was an account of
Tormay’s alleged personal experience of the horrors of the so-called Aster Revolution following
WWI and the subsequent short-lived Soviet Republic of Hungary. Having being part of the
Habsburg Monarchy, in October 1918 Hungary became independent and in November 1918
formed a Democratic Republic with a new social-democratic government. Amidst the increasing
difficulties faced by the government, the communists rapidly mobilized under the leadership of
Béla Kun and in March of 1919 proclaimed Hungary a Soviet Republic.6 While writing in first
person, Tormay’s book spoke on behalf the Hungarian gentry and privileged classes whose
former existence and power was wiped away by the Communists.7 And considering the
prevailing fears of the ruling classes across Europe about the spread of the “Communist
Menace,” we can understand why Tormay’s book was well received not only in Hungary but
also abroad.8
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Tormay, who had been recognized as an important literary figure through such works as
People Between the Stones and The Old House changed genre and became overtly political with
An Outlaw’s Diary.9 Similarly to her male counterparts and perhaps even more so than most of
them, in An Outlaw’s Diary (1921) Tormay openly expressed her political views. The book
begins with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the establishment of independent
Hungary. The following is a short excerpt in which Tormay describes her feelings, as she was
standing in front of the Hungarian Parliament when the establishment of the Hungarian
Democratic Republic was announced publicly on November 16, 1918:
It is to our everlasting shame that no single Hungarian rose to choke these
words. In the Hall of Hungary's parliament Lenin's agent could unfurl at his ease
the flag of Bolshevism, could blow the clarion of social revolution and announce
the advent of a world revolution, while outside, in Parliament Square, Lovászi and
Bokányi, accompanied by Jászi, informed the people that the National Council
had proclaimed the Republic. On the staircase Károlyi made another
oration. Down in the square, Landler, Weltler, Preusz and other Jews glorified
the Republic- there was not a single Hungarian among them. That was the secret
of the whole revolution. Above: the mask, Michael Károlyi; below: the foreign
race has proclaimed its mastery.10
As the excerpt reveals Tormay despised both the Social Democratic government and especially
the subsequent Communist rule as alien to Hungary and to “true” Hungarians. In fact, no excerpt
can sufficiently reflect the extent to which the two volumes of An Outlaw’s Diary expressed
blatantly antisemitic, anti-liberal, and anticommunist views. Tormay rants against Jews and
Communists and provides detailed descriptions of their horrible misdeeds. In stark contrast, she
narrates the emerging Hungarian resistance in a glorious light. The diary describes the sacrifices
made to reclaim Hungary for real Christian Hungarians.
Throughout the book Tormay portrays herself as one of the many heroes who were
destined to fight the Judeo-Communist menace. Not shy about highlighting her own role in
aiding the resistance Tormay depicts herself as a spiritual leader who with her faith provided
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support in the direst moments. “I am only a wandering flame, please take from my fire, carry it
into the darkness, and use it to lighten up the homes, so we can wait for the dawn, when once
again the morning will be Hungarian and Christian. Because I swear to God, our morning will
come.”11 Thus, having disparaged the “enemies” an Outlaw’s Diary also portrays the force of
steadfast Christian, ethnic Hungarians as redemptive. The story of counter-revolutionary forces
(herself included) as the true representatives and heroic saviours of the nation, assured that once
Admiral Miklós Horthy and the conservative forces secured control over the country, the book
would gain literary success and its writer cultural and political prominence.12 Tormay was one
of the people who welcomed “the Admiral on horseback” and their alliance proved beneficial for
both.13
With the restoration of conservative power in Hungary in 1920, Tormay became one of
the most visible faces of what would be known as the Horthy era (1920-44).14 Admiral Horthy
(Regent of Hungary during the interwar period) held Tormay in the highest regard and supported
her professional and political pursuits, some of which –like becoming the first female editor in
chief of the most prestigious conservative literary journal of the time, Napkelet (Eastern Sunrise)
–had been previously unimaginable for women. 15 In turn, Tormay worked tirelessly for the
Horthy led conservative Hungarian state. As the celebrated writer of the An Outlaw’s Diary and
as president of the National Association of Hungarian Women (NAHW), Tormay propagated the
official Christian nationalist conservative doctrine.16
Tormay’s celebrity was unsurpassed despite the fact that in the mid 1920s she was
involved in the largest political scandal of the Horthy regime. The scandal involved Countess
Eduardina Pallavicini Zichy, her friend and co-founder of the conservative women’s
organization, who along with Tormay, was part of Admiral Horthy’s closest political and cultural
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circle. Pallavicini’s husband, Count Rafael Zichy, who came from one of the noblest and
politically empowered Hungarian families, filed for divorce based on charges of
termèszetellenes, an “unnatural” relationship between his wife and Cécile Tormay. And while
news of bickering aristocrats and serious power struggles among the political elite was not a
novelty for Hungarians, filing for divorce because of a wife’s lesbianism was unprecedented and
ensured the divorce’s immediate notoriety and its scandalous place in the public eye for years to
come. After four years and having been tried in three different courts the trial ended with
denying the Count’s appeal for divorce and sentencing him for libel.17
From the damning accounts given during testimony to the conflicting experts’ opinions
the decision could have gone either way however, it was in the greatest interest of the interwar
political leadership to clear Cécile Tormay’s name. In addition to Horthy’s personal loyalty to
Tormay, by the mid 1920s Tormay had come to represent the conservative authoritarian regime.
Her works were considered to capture the experience and greatness of Hungary and Tormay
herself was celebrated as a national icon. Therefore, in the eyes of the political leadership an
attack on an individual seen as the public face of the Horthy regime, even if it was about her
personal life, was construed as an attack on the regime itself. There are indications that it was
the admiral himself who personally intervened into the judicial process to make sure that
Tormay’s reputation remained untarnished. The diary of Páter Zadravecz, who was the Bishop of
the Hungarian Military between 1920 and 1928 and a close friend of Admiral Miklós Horthy
provides the most explicit and direct evidence of Horthy’s maneuverings. In Secret Diary of
Father Zadravecz, the former bishop recalls the time when Horthy told him that he “put pressure
on” the judges of the trial to arrive to the desirable outcome. 18 At the end, the final rulings of the
trial were a testament that an attack on Tormay was not to be tolerated. The courts discredited
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Count Zichy and sentenced him to prison while they went on to redeem the respectability of
Hungary’s two most important female patriots, Cécile Tormay and Countess Zichy. In the words
of the judges in the criminal trial,
On one hand, there stands a person [the Count] driven by an irresistible passion, who
would not even hesitate or feel remorse for a committing crime and living an utterly
selfish life. While, on the other hand, there are two intellectually and ethically high
standing people who have been making important contributions to the betterment of the
public, whose ethical purity has not been the tiniest bit overshadowed by this case.19
In their verdict the judges made it unmistakably clear how people should remember the
scandalous legal suit. Thereby, not only was the outcome of the trial secured but so too was its
legacy.20
Consequently, despite her alleged love affairs with women and the fact that she never
married and only lived with women did not seem to tarnish Tormay’s charisma. During the
interwar era she endured as one of the most visible and intellectually recognized Hungarian
female figures and also achieved considerable international attention. She was nominated for the
Nobel Prize in literature twice (1936, 1937) and following the death of Marie Curie in 1935, was
selected into the Committee of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations. For the
Hungarian political leadership Tormay remained the most visible female representative of
Christian Hungary even following her death in 1937.

Tormay’s Reemergence and Ascent to Prominence
Following World War II and the establishment of Communist Dictatorship in 1948,
Tormay’s works were banned for their “fascist and anti-communist” content. Her Christian
conservative world view aside, at the time when countries in the Eastern Block were supposed to
be one happy family under Soviet paternalism, her irredentist views demanding territorial
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revisions were unpalatable at best. During the four decades of Communism, Tormay’s name
remained taboo and her works were only printed in émigré communities outside of Hungary.21
The initial climate following 1989 and the end of the Cold War were similarly unreceptive to
Tormay. During the 1990s the public and politicians alike were interested in recovering
Hungary’s democratic traditions. New histories were needed that would show how despite
Hungary’s historically rocky road, experiencing both left and right wing extremism and
subjugation by Great Powers (whether the Ottoman, the Habsburg, or the Soviet Empire),
Hungary was destined to be a democratic country. Like elsewhere in the former Eastern Block,
Hungarian officials had to (re)create historical traditions and usable pasts that were acceptable
for a newfound democracy.22 Amidst the regional desire to join Western Europe, where
according to the new national histories “they always belonged,” they also needed national role
models from the past who embodied a new democratic spirit. Concomitant to countries of the
former Soviet block racing each other to gain membership in the European Union, was these
countries’ desire to demonstrate their “Europeanism.” As part of this undertaking, communist
narratives, written and visual, were replaced by carefully selected pro-European histories and
historical figures.23 Most visibly apparent, was how across East-Central Europe statues of
democratic statesmen replaced formerly larger than life socialist statutes.24 In this climate, the
memories of Cécile Tormay and the interwar era she represented remained latent in mainstream
politics.
Political changes brought an end to the six-decade long silencing of Tormay’s memory.
Tormay, whose Bujdosó könyv had become a seminal work for members of the former national
socialist émigrés living in the West, from the late 1990s was also becoming a household name
within the incipient radical right in Hungary.25 However, it was not until following the political
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realignment in 2004 and the global financial crisis of 2008 that her name would enter
mainstream Hungarian discourse. When it became clear that democracy could not fulfil the
hopes and dreams of great segments of the population and in fact, that many faired worse under
democracy than during Goulash Communism, Hungary went through a political realignment. By
Hungary’s entry to the European Union in 2004 politics had become polarized around two
parties. On one side stood the socialist (MSzP) while on the other was the centre-right Fidesz.26
2006 saw the onset of radicalisation and realignment of Hungarian politics. Soon after the reelection of the socialist led government, the leaking of socialist Prime Minister Ferenc
Gyurcsány’s private party speech – where he admitted that the socialists had been lying in order
to be re-elected – led to mass protests and calls for the resignation of Gyurcsány and his
government.27 Gyurcsány’s admission of systematic dishonesty to the public about the country’s
economic prospects and the subsequent announcement of necessary austerity measures resulted
not simply in the loss of credibility of MSzP but also in the meteoric rise of the Hungarian far
right party Jobbik.28
By 2008 the euphoric days of celebrating liberal capitalism and democracy were gone.
At the same time, amidst growing financial problems and widening socio-economic inequalities,
radical nationalist and anti-EU sentiments begin to gain serious traction for the first time since
1989. In an atmosphere of wide spread disillusionment the largest opposition party, Fidesz, and
the rapidly rising radical far right party, Jobbik, expressed radical nationalistic and anti-EU
sentiments29 Concomitant with a shift to populist nationalism there was a conspicuous change in
the language of politics. Along with ardent nationalism, anticommunism, and antisemitism,
conservative gender norms came to dominate even mainstream political discourse. The time was
ripe for Tormay’s reemergence.30
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Bújdosó Könyv was initially rediscovered at a time when anti-communist and antisemitic
remarks were still considered to have no place in mainstream public discourse. In the eyes of
members of the far right and soon many on the right the book could express and vindicate their
views about the ills of Hungarian politics and society. And with the turn of political tides they
discovered that the book’s writer, Tormay, had much more to offer. In contrast to her more
“modern” female contemporaries, like Margit Schlachta, Catholic social activist, writer, and first
female member of the Hungarian parliament who supported women’s advancement and opposed
anti-Jewish legislation, Tormay was a much more palatable figure. As a successful conservative
female writer and proponent of traditional gender norms, the ideologue of the formerly despised
Horthy era could offer a new historical icon not only for the far right but also to the new right.31
Tormay’s reappearance came in 2010 when following its landslide victory the Fidesz led
government made the reestablishment of Christian nationalism a central goal.32 Aside from
flexing its muscles vis-à-vis the European Union and the IMF the leadership’s aim to protect
national interests also brought about a sea change in the assessment of Hungary’s interwar
history. Although since 1989 there had been an apparent diversification of points of views in
considering Hungary’s history between the wars, official interpretations saw the interwar years
in a critical light. They tended to stress the era’s antisemitic and undemocratic policies and the
increasingly authoritarian and fascist nature of governments that ultimately culminated in the
Holocaust and murder of 600’000 Hungarian Jews.33 This was all about to change as the new
government, fuelled by the far right and its Christian Democratic coalition partner, set out to
introduce major reinterpretations of the history of the interwar era.34 Aided by government
friendly conservative and populist critics and historians such as Mária Schmidt or László
Tőkéczki, both democratic and communist revolutions of 1918-9 were portrayed in a purely
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negative light.35 In addition, they also stressed the historical responsibility of the Arrow Cross
Party and the Hungarian far right more generally in the Holocaust.36 Making the far left and far
right responsible for all historical ills there could be a comprehensive effort to reclaim the
Horthy regime as a popular and effective one with successful social and economic policies.37
Cécile Tormay’s works would lend themselves to all of these efforts.
As part of a 2010 government sponsored public campaign there were no less than
fourteen different books of Tormay’s published, most of them seeing print for the first time since
the 1930s. Along with her books, Tormay’s literary and political significance increasingly
occupied pro-government, right leaning media pundits. The reprinting of Tormay’s An Outlaw’s
Diary in 2010 could not have been timelier. In its book review titled, the “Forgotten Genius”
about “one of the greatest and most successful female writers” the largest centre-right paper
announced, “Every Hungarian should read this book; it will help them understand the philosophy
and demonic power of treasonous international bolshevism.”38 The reemergence of Tormay
aligned with the reconstruction of Hungarian history around one of its most contentious
periods—that of 1918-9. As evidenced by articles and op-eds in the pro-Fidesz conservative
daily Magyar Nemzet and also on the far right’s web-based publications such as Kuruc.info in
the eyes of rightist and far right critics, the complete erasure of Tormay’s history following the
establishment of Communist regime in 1948 was symbolic of the Communist distortion of
Hungarian national history.39 They pointed out how throughout Communism (1948-1989) the
democratic and communist revolutions of 1918 and 1919 were presented in a favourable light.
This was particularly the case with the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, which was
presented as a precursor of post World War II Communism. Since 1989 this historiographical
portrayal shifted and new histories stressed the disastrous and violent nature of the short-lived
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Hungarian Soviet Republic.40 However, in their attack conservatives no longer wished to see
even the democratic (Aster) revolution of 1918 as the precursor of democracy. Now it was seen
as the precursor to extreme far left violence and chaos and commentators relied on Tormay’s
supposedly first hand accounts to confirm their view.
The reprinting of Tormay’s An Outlaw’s Diary was a well-orchestrated event that
provided a wide platform for attacking liberal and socialist opposition and also underscored an
unmistakable conservative shift in the historical interpretation of Hungarian political history.
Magyar Nemzet commented on the occasion of the (re)publication of Tormay’s works:
The undeservedly forgotten Cécile Tormay became the target of left-wing
liberalism, which even in the Horthy era conveyed a powerful influence, because
in her two-part novel, “Bujdosó könyv,” [An Outlaw’s Diary], Tormay unveiled
the treason of Mihály Károlyi, the Aster Revolution’s anti-Hungarian, antinationalist nature, and the horrors of the Soviet Republic. The contemporary
press of the left, with practices that were similar to the current media’s, portrayed
Tormay’s personal life in a despicable humiliating way chasing the writer
suffering from heart disease to her death. Few people are aware today, that Cécile
Tormay was not only nominated for the Nobel Prize, but in fact was awarded this
highest literary recognition in the world in 1937. It was only her death in April of
1937 and the strict rules of the Noble Prize [against posthumous awards] that
stopped her from receiving it.41
As this paragraph attests, gone were the subtleties of the 1990s, now the right launched a frontal
attack. They openly demanded not only the reexamination of Hungarian history but also its
reinterpretation. Tormay in these accounts appears not simply as a writer who had been unjustly
shelved because of her politics but a writer who was also a legitimate voice in interpreting the
history of 1918 and 1919. Her new proponents, with the words of an article in Magyar Nemzet,
believed that in Tormay a forgotten “authentic Hungarian voice” had been rediscovered.42 Most
public media channels, which were now under government control celebrated the reemergence of
Tormay and her works not just as the unearthing of a forgotten heroine but also cast her as
someone whose life accomplishments and works had moral resonance for present and future
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generations.43 As one of the chief journalists in Magyar Nemzet suggested it was time to focus
on the positive aspects of Hungarian history and create a usable past within which future
generations could find positive ideas and role models.44
What was conspicuously absent in these portrayals was any open or explicit discussion
about Tormay’s sexuality or private life. Commentaries on the right used a tactic in which they
avoided providing details about the sexual scandal involving Tormay while simultaneously
dismissing it as false history. The articles in Magyar Nemzet and on kuruc.info illustrate how
even as they could not totally ignore it, publications of right and the far right managed to allude
to the scandal in order to criticize media, which according to the right’s reinterpretation “chased
the writer to her death.”45 Like most media sources Magyar Nemzet refused to explicitly discuss
or provide any details about what the media during the 1920s accused Tormay of, and what in
the view of Magyar Nemzet consequently caused her health to deteriorate. Without any specific
references to the nature of the scandal or questions about Tormay’s sexuality critics on the right
condemned (contemporary and historic) left and liberal media for their supposedly immoral ways
of reporting.46 According to this circular logic since socialist and liberal media sources were
immoral in their reporting they also fabricated their stories and sensationalized their reporting.
Hence, whatever Tormay was accused of was false. For that reason, there was no discussion
necessary about Tormay’s personal life. The result of such tactics was that Tormay’s fame
continued to rise.
The Hungarian Academy of Arts dedicated 2012 as the year of commemoration for
Tormay. She was frequently in the national media, radio, television, and Internet. Tormay’s first
family novel A régi ház [The Old House] was published as one of the books inaugurating the
establishment of a National Book series that aimed to be representative of “the love of
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Hungarians and of the Hungarian nation.”47 Reflecting their growing populism the increasingly
right wing government made frequent references to Greater Hungary not only to court their own
and far right constituencies but also, having granted preferential citizenship rights to ethnic
Hungarians living outside of Hungary, to ensure a new and grateful voting block.48 Thus, the
words “love of Hungarians and the Hungarian nation” embodied the populist’s nationalist
platform that envisioned the cultural community of Hungary encompassing all ethnic Hungarians
living in the pre-Trianon borders.49 The target audience was all Hungarians including Hungarian
speaking minorities abroad; the aim was to “strengthen national self-esteem.”50 Accordingly, in
order to restore Hungarian self-esteem it was important to identify and resurrect “appropriate”
historical heroes who would reinvigorate national pride. In the words of Imre Kerényi, the
Prime-ministerial Commissioner for the series “the heroes” were selected to be representative of
“those who not simply wrote lyrical poetries, but also actually did something in order to raise the
nation after Trianon.”51 These true heroes, like Cécile Tormay, were to symbolize defiant
strength and the patriotic resilience of Hungarians.
From 2010 onwards, the atmosphere was ripe for looking for new villains and
rehabilitating historical figures from the interwar conservative era that during the pro-European
Union times had been too controversial to touch. The Fidesz led government became the first
Hungarian government that openly expressed hostility against the EU (in terms of its economic
austerity and minority policies) and put internal national concerns ahead of European integration.
The right capitalized on, and by an aggressive media campaign further fuelled, anti-EU
sentiments that had been steadily growing since 2008.52 Like most places in the former Eastern
Block, people faced growing economic hardship, a shrinking social net, and a growing
disillusionment with politics and the European Union. On the international scene, Prime
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Minister Viktor Orbán was aggressively working on “reinstating Hungary’s autonomy” vis-à-vis
the powerful decision makers of the EU and encouraged other small member states to do the
same.53 His efforts raised alarm on the international scene and commentators highlighted his
arrogant personality along with his party’s (Fidesz) nationalistic, and undemocratic politics.54 At
home however, his fight, which was portrayed as one of “David vs. Goliath”, proved popular
among Hungarians.
Sticking up for Hungary’s interest within the EU, on the national front the government
continued to reframe and institutionalize their revisionist version of Hungarian history. The
rewriting of the Hungarian Constitution in 2011 was only the most conspicuous example of the
seriousness with which leading rightist elites took the fundamental restructuring of the history of
the Horthy era. Utilizing print and visual media, the Fidesz led government became intent on
making the interwar period exemplary of conservative Christian order and fierce patriotism.55
This is most explicit in the new constitution or Basic Law. As the national avowal of the Basic
Law states, “[W]e date the restoration of our country’s self-determination, lost on the nineteenth
day of March 1944, from the second day of May 1990, when the first freely elected organ of
popular representation was formed.”56 By bracketing the Horthy era as having ended either with
Hungary’s entry into World War II in 1941 or alternatively with the German occupation in
March 1944, the right could exonerate the interwar regime of the Holocaust and ethnic
cleansing.57 Having been vindicated, it was time to celebrate the accomplishments and legacy of
the Horthy regime. Cultural events sprung up nationwide to reclaim the venerable place of
interwar culture and society. Reflecting official policies these events with titles such as
“Suspended and forgotten: The years of silence and silencing in Hungarian literature,” aimed to
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restore conservative literary works and their authors, while making an overt stab at the socialist
past.58

Remembering and Constructing Gender
Restoring honour into the Hungarian public consciousness notwithstanding, it was no
accident that Tormay was so warmly embraced. Her conservative ideas about the specific
responsibilities of men and women in serving their country also lent itself to Fidesz’s goal of
restoring “the sanctity” of Hungarian families. As the government was rewriting the Hungarian
constitution to legally enshrine and define family as a heterosexual marriage with children, the
resurrection of Tormay’s interwar ideas about the preeminence of the collective over the
individual could not have been timelier.59 In Tormay’s view, women in Hungary until World
War I enjoyed a sheltered and fulfilling life in the home. During the upheavals of the war
women were employed in unprecedented numbers in previously “male” occupations and
contributed to the war efforts. However, according to Tormay it was time to return to their
homes, as it was there, where Hungarian women would become members of the counterrevolution. Thus, ironically, very unlike Tormay herself who was unmarried and had a visible
public profile, she believed that women should help to reclaim Christian Hungary only by
providing moral support to their husbands at home. What Christian Hungary required from
women, according to Tormay, was “the Holy Trinity for which we are meant to stand: a
Christian and patriotic policy, the integrity of the country, and the sanctity of the family.”60
Similarly to right wing and conservative interwar women’s movements across Europe the
Tormay led National Association of Hungarian Women believed that women should “complete”
their male counterparts within the private domestic sphere, give birth to many healthy children,
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and live by patriotic and above all, Christian principles.61 Tormay’s vision, which came to
define the official conservative rhetoric on womanhood throughout the 1920s and 1930s, in the
eyes of the governing twenty-first century political elite came to have renewed relevance in
Hungarian social and cultural politics.62
Considering a rapidly aging population, declining marriage and fertility rates along with a
growing number of non-traditional family formations that the Fidesz government faced, such
vision, albeit modified for the twenty-first century, was worthy of commemoration. Fidesz along
with its coalition party the Christian Democrats made the restoration of the (heterosexual)
family, composed with a minimum of two children, their highest priority. This goal was
institutionalized by the New Constitution, which states the following,
(1) Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman
established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis of the survival of the
nation. Family ties shall be based on marriage or the relationship between parents and
children.
(2) Hungary shall encourage the commitment to have children.
(3) The protection of families shall be regulated by a cardinal Act.63
In this context, Tormay’s message, which prescribed deference to authority, devoutness to the
church, the sanctity of marriage, and the importance of having children, proved as timely as ever.
Thus, Tormay’s twenty-first century renaissance was intimately tied to the institutionalization of
a new and conservative perspective on gender and family. A further testament to this came as in
March 2012 when a bust was erected in Budapest commemorating Tormay as one of the
“Greatest Hungarian Women.”64 As Sándor Lezsák, Fidesz MP and vice president of the
parliament who unveiled the bust noted, “while oeuvres can be silenced for decades, their values
will always win new existence, as is happening with all of Tormay’s works.”65 The
commemoration received national media attention. The public media, which the governing party
Fidesz controlled along with centre-right news sources, celebrated and praised the occasion.
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Tormay’s Critics and her Descent
The occasion of the unveiling of Tormay’s bust also marked a pivotal moment in the
opposition to Tormay’s rehabilitation. Although there had been critical voices about the
(re)emergence of Tormay prior, the physical memorialization galvanized the political left,
liberal, civil, Jewish, and even lgbtq organizations who criticized the erecting of a public
monument to a writer who was so virulently antisemitic and expressed concerns about the
repercussions of such an act.66 Antisemitism was only one of talking points that critics raised
about Tormay. Her admiration of fascism was another one. Critics who opposed her official
idolization, also frequently cited Tormay’s statement, “I was a fascist before Mussolini ever
appeared on the horizon.”67 They argued that even if Tormay did not live to see the catastrophic
outcome of her fascist ideology that should not serve as an excuse for her views. Finally, across
oppositionists, with the exception of the lgbtq organizations, people commented on Tormay’s
alleged homosexuality underscoring the irony of conservatives erecting a statue to a “known”
homosexual woman.68 All of these voices expressed concerns, akin to those in an article in the
liberal weekly Magyar Narancs, that by commemorating Tormay as “one of the greatest
Hungarians” without taking into consideration her personal and political views implied their
dismissal as significant issues, or even worse, the legitimatization of Tormay’s fascist,
irredentist, and antisemitic views.69
In the autumn of 2012, a month after her bust was erected Tormay once again became the
centre of a nationwide controversy. This time however, the stakes were much higher. In its
efforts to centralize power and (re)instill conservative nationalist values Fidesz appointed
loyalists to major cultural organizations such as the National Theatre as well as to important
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academic institutions and organizations.70 As part of reorienting Hungary’s cultural and
scientific values, Fidesz embarked on a reformation of the national educational system, including
the national core curriculum. During the preparation, conservatives and importantly Jobbik, the
far right party both actively lobbied for the inclusion of previously neglected interwar writers,
including Tormay.
They argued that with the words of one literary historian, “The new National Curriculum would
be incomplete and distorted without writers of a Christian worldview who actually dealt with the
question of national destiny.”71 For many people on the right and in particular on the far right,
the incorporation of Tormay, along with Albert Wass and others were seen as a corrective to
communist and post-communist histories—a pivotal recovery of Hungarian writers who spoke of
a greater Christian Hungary. In their eyes, these previously silenced writers represented “true”
Hungarianness and also offered a more genuine perspective, one that presented Hungarians not
as people who quailed after World War I but rather as people who were willing to stand up for
what had historically been theirs. Indeed, Tormay appealed to many who felt that because of the
history of victorious neighbours who benefitted from the Treaty of Trianon, the oppressive
communist era, and the post 89 so called, Holocaust “remembrance industry”, it was high time
that public discourse focused on some positive and uniting aspects of Hungarianness.72
The subsequent national debate over the inclusion of Tormay that played out on all media
channels was representative of deep schisms about the historical memory of interwar Hungary.
As a journalist in the Népszabadság, the largest socialist daily poignantly noted, “thinking in
terms of the nation, the pain of Trianon and the possibility of revaluation of the Horthy era stirs
emotional tides in many people. The Hungarian audience is looking for a stable national
identity.” 73 Consequently, even critics of Fidesz and the far right recognized that the appeal of
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Tormay and her works lay in offering a vision of a powerful Hungary with a clear moral and
social order. For the right, reintroducing the works of interwar writers was a question of
historical equity, a long overdue correction of the historical biases of previous political regimes.
Importantly, they also spoke of a need of reviving the previously silenced era of
Hungarian history because it would build the right kind of national character.74 But the exact
kind of national character they were thinking of was rather unclear. Considering the blatantly
antisemitic and irredentist militant views of the writers to be included, for liberal and socialist
critics it was evident that the new curriculum was to endorse an exclusionary, chauvinistic, and
anti-European worldview. Not entirely disagreeing with this interpretation, Jobbik and far right
voices on kuruc.info argued that Tormay along with other interwar writers represented true
patriotic Hungarianness and should be exalted as historical role models. For the far right then,
the antisemitism and irredentist view of these writers were part of their appeal. That Tormay’s
personal life (her non-normative gender and sexual behaviour) was not the kind of Hungarian
national character Jobbik was actively promoting was therefore seen as less important.
Members of Fidesz and critics close to the government took a more measured approach.
For instance, while representatives of Fidesz acknowledged that Tormay could have held
antisemitic views, at the same time they argued that her personal views should not justify the
exclusion of her non-political novels from the National Curriculum.75 At the same time,
considering the systematic appointment of government friendly personnel as heads of national
cultural institutions and the billing of plays and events celebrating real (meaning non-Jewish)
patriotic, conservative Hungarian writers, the acknowledgment of Tormay’s antisemitism
seemed more like playing lip service to growing international criticism than a real
acknowledgement of the problem of antisemitism.76 Furthermore, conservative pro-Fidesz
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experts such as Mihály Takaró emphasised that for future generations it would be essential that
writers like Cécile Tormay, who were “true patriots and held a genuinely Christian worldview,”
be included in the National Curriculum.”77
Regardless of their political and ideological loyalties, most critics found it amusing (and
helpful for generating readership) to draw attention to the absurdity of the far right and right’s
idolization of a “homosexual.” Articles with headings such as “Jobbik is demanding a lesbian in
the school texts” poked fun of the far right’s hypocrisy for using Tormay as a national icon
despite of the fact that she was a “known lesbian.”78 That everyone on the right remained
strategically silent about the personal life of Tormay did not help to quell those observers who
eagerly brought attention to the official idolization of an allegedly homosexual woman at time of
blatantly hostile and discriminatory politics against Hungary’s lgbtq communities. Since Fidesz
came into power in 2010, as part of its mission to save so called, traditional “normal” families, it
instituted discriminatory policies against Hungarian homosexuals. By defining marriage
between man and a woman it was the first government that aimed to halt progress on the path to
sexual equality that the homosexual community had achieved since the decriminalization of
homosexuality in 1961 and especially since 1989.79 While civil partnership continues to exist
the 2011 constitution and 2013 civil code were explicit in establishing a hierarchy between
marriage and civil partnership.80 Fidesz and especially its small coalition partner the Christian
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) were intent on institutionalizing protections for their ideal
family, which were to be defined as a union between married heterosexual adults with their own
children. Based on the Family Protection Act passed in 2011 same-sexual relationships (along
with non-married heterosexual unions) were relegated to secondary status with less protection
and fewer entitlements.81 While the Constitutional Court subsequently struck down some of the
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discriminatory elements of the law, in its rhetoric the government remained clear about the
mutually exclusive nature of family and same-sexual relationships.82 In the words of Pèter
Harrach, the faction leader of the KDNP, family was “natural” while same-sex civil partnership
was a “choice.”83 Jobbik went even further, effectively declaring an open war against what they
see as “homosexual lifestyle.” Inspired by Russia, in 2012 a Jobbik member of parliament
proposed an amendment to the Constitution that would have made the “promotion of
homosexual lifestyle” a criminal offense carrying a possible prison sentence of three years.84
Nevertheless, despite their sanctification of heteronormativity and campaign against
homosexuals Tormay’s sexuality posed no issue for either Jobbik or Fidesz.
In the end, the final version of the National Core Curriculum that came into effect in
January 2013 does not contain any reference to Tormay or her work. Amidst loud criticism from
all corners, including some conservative academics, for FIDESZ strategically it was not worth
making a crusade of including Tormay in the new curriculum.85 Ultimately, for Fidesz and the
far right, Tormay’s exclusion was a battle lost but it was by no means representative of a loss of
the broader political culture war.
Following the national curriculum debacle, in May 2013 representatives of Fidesz,
KDNP and Jobbik supported a petition to rename a district in Budapest after Tormay. Taking
place just months after the removal of Tormay from the national core curriculum it seemed like
naming a district after Tormay was going to be a consolation prize for Fidesz and especially her
fiercest advocate Jobbik. Following a petition from the special envoy of the Prime Minister the
Budapest City Council voted to name a square after Tormay. Instead of a smooth bureaucratic
procedure however, the Fidesz backed mayor, encountered disapproval and fierce criticism from
all corners. For instance, Ronald S. Lauder, the president of the World Jewish Congress
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highlighted how the naming of public square after Tormay would fly in the face of Fidesz’s
promise to curb rising antisemitism, “This decision by the Budapest city government [...] puts
into question the pledge given to the Jewish community that anti-Semitism will be fought
vigorously by the Hungarian authorities.”86 Lauder’s remarks underscored the three part
political tight rope act of Hungarian politics whereby the far right party and its sympathizers
were getting increasingly vocal in their antisemitic (and anti-Roma and homophobic) remarks,
while the governing Fidesz party was attempting to not alienate its right wing voters by openly
denouncing their racism, and at the same time not spur liberal and centrists national and
international opposition. It was this balancing act that Lauder and critics more generally wanted
Fidesz to stop. The naming of a public square after Tormay was sending a message that Fidesz
had no genuine intention of doing so.
Sensing that public opinion was against it the City Council formally requested the
Humanities Research Centre of the National Academy of Science to evaluate whether the City
Council would be justified in renaming a square after Tormay. Taking place during the
structural reorganization of the National Academy of Science, which many saw as Fidesz’s next
step in cementing it’s power, the eventual decision came as a surprise slap in the face to the
increasingly right-wing government. Instead of toeing the line the resolution of the Academy of
Science categorically rejected the legitimacy of representing Tormay as a venerable national
icon. According to the resolution,
Both as a writer and a public figure Tormay was driven by racism and racist principles…
As an ideologue and a propagator she played a large role in the establishment of the
intellectual background and social embeddedness of the authoritarian regime… This is
true despite the fact that she died in 1937, which means that she did not personally play a
role in the totalitarian system [of the far right during World War II].87
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The resolution concluded that under no circumstances should any public space be named after
Tormay. Citing the resolution, the mayor of Budapest conceded and the plan to name public
spaces after Tormay was dropped.
Despite receiving national media attention the incident itself represented a relatively
minor political blow to Fidesz and the Mayor of Budapest. To all those disappointed in the
outcome on the right, Fidesz could point to (and blame) the Academy of Science for the decision.
It was a two-fold win. In other words, the withdrawal of Tormay’s name showed that despite
international outcry to the contrary, cultural and scientific institutions were still independent and
not under the thumb of the government. Simultaneously, Fidesz could demonstrate to its far
right voters that it really did try to commemorate Tormay. The renaming saga was a much more
significant event in terms of the ongoing cultural crusade to rehabilitate the interwar conservative
Horthy regime. That the supreme scientific authority in the country made a clear statement
describing Tormay as a figure who worked on the “establishment of an authoritarian system”
was a clear message that the right’s reinterpretation of Hungarian history would continue to face
opposition. Despite this, having once again won the election by a landslide in April 2014, Fidesz
has made it unmistakably clear that it has no intention of stopping rewriting of Hungarian
history. 88 The glorification of the interwar Horthy era appears to march on.89

Conclusion: “Quo Vadis Hungary?”
In the first two decades after the democratic changes in 1989 Hungarian politics both on
the domestic and the international fronts were in favour of integrating Hungary into the European
Union. During this time, historians, public intellectuals, and politicians alike could finally begin
to more openly reassess Hungary’s pre-Communist and Communist histories. In search for new,
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more objective historical narratives there was a diversification of viewpoints. However,
intellectuals as well as politicians refrained from offering a total revisionist account of interwar
history, and the Horthy regime continued to be portrayed in a critical light. In 2010 after the
landslide victory of Fidesz and after Jobbik became the third largest party in the Hungarian
parliament, the Horthy era was praised and became framed in a positive light. Hence, the
increasingly heated public debates about Cécile Tormay are representative of a broader
renegotiation of the legacy of the interwar conservative regime she championed. The
controversies around the erection of a statue commemorating her as one of the “Greatest
Hungarian Women,” the debates over introducing her works into the national core curriculum,
and the re-naming of a public square after Tormay, became heated because they reflected the ongoing revaluation of some of the most contentious periods in of Hungarian history.
Ultimately, what was perhaps most surprising about the rehabilitation of Tormay was not
that conservatives and especially the far right found her (along with many other interwar
figures’) antisemitic, irredentist, strong nationalist sentiments, and traditional gender views
appealing and timely. Rather, what was surprising was that they did so without considering, or
in fact in spite of, the details of Tormay’s personal life, which represented everything
conservatives and the far right were advocating against. Namely, a strong independent woman,
who never married or had children, worked in a male profession and (as all historical evidence
points to), was also a woman who desired those of her own sex.90 Thus, while Tormay’s
writings and public work were well-suited to stand for advocating a family centred vision and
traditional gender norms, her personal life fell noticeably short from the twenty-first century
conservative and far right ideologies. Yet, despite a seeming discordancy between Tormay’s
personal life and the political platform of her twenty-first century revivers, she was
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unconditionally embraced. In part we can account for this by simply pointing out how both the
right and the far right claimed ignorance or dismissed questions about Tormay’s personal life as
irrelevant or a smear campaign by political opposition. Focusing exclusively on her literary
works and public persona moreover made both Tormay’s gender as well as her sexuality
irrelevant to their goals. It was in fact precisely because they ignored Tormay’s sexuality and
gender that Tormay was able to become a usable figure. By disregarding that she was a woman
she could occupy male (literary and public) spheres whereas by ignoring her (non-normative)
sexuality she could stand for all women and speak for patriarchal policies and views.
Placing these approaches in the history of gender and sexuality and in particular in the
history of official approaches to non-normative sexuality reveals how these twenty-first century
strategies are far from unique. Like their far right and conservative historical counterparts in
Hungary and elsewhere, for Jobbik and Fidesz, an abstract conservative female figure could
serve not only as a spokesperson for, but also as a representative of their ideal nation.91 Through
her literary works that portray traditional and complementary norms for men and women Tormay
has come to symbolize not only Hungarian women but also the Hungarian nation. Furthermore,
upholding Tormay’s vision of traditional gender norms as ideal and inspirational while at the
same time deeming Tormay’s actual personal life irrelevant has been a rule rather than an
exception. In their approach to sexuality, twenty-first century Hungarian conservatives and far
right politicians followed in the footsteps of their interwar and state-socialist counterparts. The
imposition of silence around and lack of public engagement with issues of their own members
and protégés non-normative sexuality cut across the various political systems. Consequently,
each of these systems could rally around individuals whose personal and sexual life was outside
of these regimes’ espoused ideals of heteronormative, family centred social life. Thus, rather
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than a novelty, the embrace of Tormay was representative of a long history of idealizing public
individuals who privately led lives of non-normative sexual or gender conduct.
Finally, even those who criticized Tormay’s commemoration did not choose to discuss or
critically reflect on the issues around Tormay’s sexual orientation. Using hearsay and one
newspaper article from the early 2000s that actually described some of the details of the scandal
in the 1920s, most commentators simply took it for granted that Tormay was a lesbian. From
2010 onwards as Tormay’s name was increasingly circulating in the media, socialist and liberal
politicians, journalists and bloggers alike referred to Tormay’s lesbianism as “public
knowledge.” Such nonchalant and uncritical handling of historical sexuality and the scandal
around Tormay confirmed that sexuality was still, just as it was during the 1920s, primarily a
tool for political (and personal) purposes. The opposition’s frequent references to Tormay’s
alleged lesbianism were not to further lgbtq rights but to mock and undermine Fidesz and Jobbik
and more generally conservatives’ moral and political authority. Thus, those on the political left
and liberal side were just as comfortable using sexual orientation for political purposes as those
on the right. Serving political purposes aside, the treatment of Tormay’s sexuality reflects the
enduring homophobia and sexism of the mainstream press. An illustrative example of this is an
opinion piece in the socialist daily, Nèpszabadság from 2012, where the author, a former high
school teacher László Rab discusses why it would be counterproductive to insert a woman “who
stole the wife of a man” into classroom discussions. How uncomfortable it would be Rab opines,
“for the teachers to have to explain to 16 year olds that they are reading a book of a woman who
desired her own sex and to explain details about how she pursued women!” 92 Ultimately,
considering Tormay’s sexual history Rab questioned how society could realistically expect boys
to pay attention to the literary qualities of Tormay. In other words, he assumed that discussing
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an author who pursued love with her own sex would be too distracting. Rab’s piece reveals how
Tormay’s assumed homosexuality could be problematic across the political spectrum.
As for Tormay’s sexuality, the case’s legacy as a part of the history of (homo)sexuality
has yet to be claimed. On one hand, strict contemporary silencing by the Horthy regime along
with the subsequent silencing of non-normative sexualities by the post Word War II communist
regime pose a considerable (although by no means impossible) burden to reconstruct and
interpret the sexuality of Tormay. On the other hand, the fact that even the lbgtq community has
not embraced Tormay is in no small part due to Tormay’s politics. Tormay’s antisemitic, fascist,
and irredentist beliefs until recently made her too controversial to be commemorated as a
foremother for Hungarian lesbians.
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